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William P. Kennedy
Problems of Accountancy and Interpretation in
Assessing Long-Term Economic Performance
"In intensity of feeling ... and not in
statistics, lies the power to move the
world. But by statistics must this power
be guided if it would move the world
aright."
Charles Booth, 1891.
In the populär mind, economic growth has generally been regarded as a "good
thing." This attitude no doubt Springs from the widely-shared feeling that if only
one's (real) income were higher—that is, if economic growth in the past had been
more rapid—one would be better off in some concrete sense. It would then be possi¬
ble to afford better housing, better transport, more varied and interesting leisure, and
so on. A little daydreaming will generally be sufficient to Iengthen this list to almost
any desired limit. Although such attitudes not only suggest a natural and feasible
means of measuring economic activity but also accurately reflect important aspects
of that activity, historical analysis, in common with the demands of public adminis¬
tration, requires a more searching evaluation of economic effort. For the historian,
this requirement stems perhaps most fundamentally from the need to measure
change over time combined with the realization that societies are complex entities
made up of many individuals whose preferences differ and whose welfares are there¬
fore differentially affected by any given change. Thus important conceptual prob¬
lems arise both in aggregating for one individual the value ofthe different goods con-
sumed (because of the necessity of assuming identical marginal utüity of expendi¬
tures on all goods) and in aggregating across many individuals the value of the con¬
sumption ofthe same good (because personal circumstances differ). These problems
are then enormously compounded by the aggregation of all goods across all consum¬
ers. The use of market prices to aecomplish these essential tasks of aggregation, with¬
out which no analysis is possible, often imposes such unacceptable assumptions
upon the historian as the belief that all observed prices are full-information equili-
brium prices, that the distribution of wealth is "optimal", or that all individuals' pre¬
ferences are identical.1 But if observed market prices are rejected, how eise is meas¬
urement to be made? Moreover, factors such as productivity, widely recognised to be
1. Sen, Amartya K., The Welfare Basis of Real Income Comparisons: A Suwey, in: Journal of
Economic Literature, 17 (1979), pp. 3-35.
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of signal importance, depend for measurement critically upon the precise designation
and valuation of economic input and Outputs. Here again, any inadequacies of ob¬
served prices have very serious consequences for measurement and analysis as well
as for resource allocation.
Because historians have always been sensitive to the intricacy of the past and be¬
cause historians* purposes are those of broad assessment and evaluation, clumsy and
insensitive Systems of measuring economic change must invariably be disturbingly
inadequate. Yet the construction of satisfactory measures has proved to be almost
paralyzingly difficult. The result has been an uneasy, resented compromise between
what can be done and what should be done. While this Situation will not be altered
easily or quickly, the first step in amelioration must be for all historians, as both con¬
sumers and producers of statistics, to be more consciously aware of both the difficul¬
ties that have been encountered in the past and the possible strategies that may be
open for progress in the future. To that end this essay has three objectives: to review
the most important inherent difficulties in measuring economic activity; to consider
some ofthe most promising remedies offered for those difficulties; and, where possi¬
ble, to consider for the remaining problems some strategies that may prove fruitful in
the future.
The problems of measuring economic activity may usefully be divided into two cate¬
gories differentiated by their amenability to the use of observed price data.2 The first
and more tractible category contains those issues where prices that in principle can
be observed can be used. The second, more intractible and perhaps—at least for his¬
torians—more important, category contains those issues that must be resolved by the
use of estimated prices because observed prices are for a number of reasons defec-
tive. Such defects may arise because observed prices are in fundamental disequili-
brium and therefore, given the preferences, technology, and resources of a particular
economy, seriously deceptive; because observed prices change over time due to both
general inflation (or deflation) and relative price movements; because, observed
prices are deemed to be unacceptably determined by a particular, possibly arbitrary,
distribution of wealth; or because observed prices are considered distorted by tariffs,
quotas, or various other types of administrative action. The conventional National
Income and Product Accounts are constructed mainly using observed prices, al¬
though imputations of unobserved but market related prices are made in certain cru¬
cial instances—most notably the value of the Services accruing to the owner-occu-
piers of houses who pay no explicit rent for their accommodation and the value of
agricultural output consumed on farms—and most National Income and Product Ac-
The stress placed in this essay on the use of prices should not be construed as limiting the
analysis only to market economies. Centrally planned economies implicitly or explicitly,
consciously or unconsciously, must produce prices in order to co-ordinate activity and those
prices (or shadow prices) will reflect the strengths and weaknesses of the planning mechan¬
ism in the same way that market-based prices reflect the strengths and weaknesses of mar¬
ket mechanisms.
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counts (NIPA) provide estimates of income and output over a span of years in con¬
stant prices even though the prices used could have at best been observed at only one
instant.
At the present, however, even disregarding problems of the second category, the
conventional NIPA are inadequate for two main reasons. First, and less importantiy,
the accounts, even in their own limited terms of reference, are not yet completely
consistent logically. Broadly, the NIPA are designed to measure a nation's economic
activity in three theoretically independent methods. One method measures the in¬
comes of all factors of production (including those located abroad but owned or re¬
siding domestically and excluding those located domestically but owned or residing
abroad) before transfers for taxes, gifts, or other unilateral payments not matched by
a countervaüing flow of goods and Services. A second method measures net value ad¬
ded in economic activity by each of a nation's productive enterprises. The third
method measures the flow of national expenditures on final goods and Services, in¬
cluding exports but excluding imports. The accounts represent a series of compro¬
mises between what may be measured easily and accurately and what is logically re¬
quired. Although the resolution of such problems is comparatively easy, extensive re-
working of the conventional accounts is often necessary and the difficulties imposed
by the inevitable sparseness of historical data can transform tedious but conceptually
routine calculations into substantial and demanding tasks of indirect estimation.
An example of the sort of anomaly of this variety likely to cause historians diffi¬
culty can be drawn from the Convention employed in the British NIPA for measuring
the value added to national income by financial intermediaries. Financial interme-
diaries have two main sources of income: (1) service charges and commissions, which
together typically account for only a small proportion of their operating income, and
(2) the net revenue resulting from charging to final borrowers a higher rate of interest
than they as a group pay to depositors. However, the British accounts, in common
with many others, treat interest payments and receipts as transfers and not as pay¬
ments and receipts for final Services.3 Thus the net earnings of financial intermediar¬
ies are generally understated, the net earnings of borrowing companies are corre-
spondingly overstated and, to the extent that private individuals rather than compa¬
nies are final borrowers, consumers' expenditure on final goods and Services is un¬
derstated. Consistency would require (1) that non-financial Company profits be re¬
duced by the amount of net interest paid to intermediaries and intermediaries' net in¬
come be similarly increased and (2) net interest payments by the personal sector to
intermediaries be treated as payment for a final (consumption) service rather than as
a transfer. In the belief that sufficient accessible evidence has not been available to
permit such reallocations among companies and between companies and individuals,
the Central Statistical Office has decided that indirect imputation of intermediaries'
value added would be more misleading than the obvious paradox of flourishing in¬
termediaries appearing to make steady annual losses, a paradox that has been pre¬
served in Charles Feinstein's indispensible volume, National Income, Expenditure,
and Output of the United Kingdom, 1855-1965, in order to maintain consistency be¬
Maurice, Rita, (editor), Central Statistical Office National Accounts Statistics: Sources and
Methods, London 1968, pp. 204-205.
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tween current and historical data series.4 However, it is made abundantly clear on all
sides that the paradox in the British NIPA of intermediaries steadily making large
losses exists only for expediency and that logically acceptible, albeit labour intensive,
alternative accounting Conventions exist, as may be seen in proposals made by the
U.N. in A System of National Accounts and Supporting Tables (New York: United
Nations, 1964) and by the OEEC, A Standardized System of National Accounts
(OEEC: Paris, 1959). It is important to stress, however, that the fundamental problem
is not one of non-existent data or of unavoidable logical inconsistency but rather a
lack of commitment and interest by both the national income accounts authorities
and historians to utilize what is available. Indeed one might argue that the quiekest
way to secure progress in this area would be for an historian to make a provisional
allocation of interest payments as dictated by logical consistency, thereby exploiting
and drawing attention to the available data and setting upper and lower bounds
to the data series most affected. Although it is only to be expected that the first
estimates will be thouroughly revised, a successful pioneering effort, by clearly
defining the problem and identifying the necessary data will greatly aid subsequent
work.
Another anomaly of a related type likely to create difficulties for historians, simply
because it creates grave problems for conventional aecountants, arises in the treat¬
ment of profits, which conceptually are calculated net of depreciation to distinguish
them clearly from cash flow but are often reported gross of depreciation because de¬
preciation is so difficult to estimate, particularly when the quality and the relative
price of capital goods changes as a result of technological progress. At the very least,
the timing of profit peaks and troughs will be affected by the procedures for measur¬
ing depreciation, but it can easily be seen that other important issues related, for ex¬
ample, to the distribution of income and the size, composition, and productivity of
the capital stock are also involved. The treatment of depreciation also affects the
measured levels of of consumption, most notably the Services derived from consumer
durables such as automobiles and household appliances. Logically, these items
should be treated in the same way as houses, being noted as additions to the capital
stock—that is, as investment—upon completion and thereafter yielding a flow of
consumption Services gradually diminishing as depreciation occurs. Consumer dura¬
bles other than houses, however, are not treated as additions to the capital stock that
subsequently yield flows of Services but as consumption items that are counted as if
they were consumed immediately upon acquisition.5 Such treatment, if accepted
without reflection, leads to nonsensical results for it implies that for identically
priced goods the rate of depreciation does not matter whereas in reality it matters a
great deal. Cars that last for four years without major repairs yield a greater flow of
Services than do cars that last only for two, although this fact is ignored in the con¬
ventional accounts except to the extent that the price of the more durable car is
greater than the price of the less durable one. In this case, as in the case of the value
added by financial intermediaries, the remedy—allocating the value of the durable
good over the time period in which it depreciates while yielding service—is straight-
4. Feinstein, Charles H., National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom,
1855-1965, Cambridge 1972, pp. 141-43.
5. Maurice, Sources and Methods, p. 365.
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forward, albeit tedious in terms of calculation and demanding in terms of data requi¬
rements.6
The more important inadequacy of the contentional accounts, however, arises not
from logical inconsistency but from an inappropriate but understandable choice of
objective. The conventional accounts are designed to measure marketed production
whereas historians, in common with most other users of the accounts, are ultimately
interested in sustainable consumption, the obvious objective of all economic activi¬
ty.7 To be sure, marketed production is an important component, perhaps even the
most important single component, of consumption and in addition substantial bene¬
fits are derived from a choice of objective which lends itself—as marketed produc¬
tion does—to relatively straightforward extrinsic measurement. Nevertheless, mar¬
keted production is not in itself an objective of economic effort and is therefore in-
herently a poor indicator of it. Furthermore, in precisely those periods when eco¬
nomic activity is undergoing important structural changes—periods such as the clas¬
sical Industrial Revolution or the emergence of post-industrial society—the relation¬
ship between marketed production and non-marketed economic activity is most
likely to be changing as well. At such times, the conventional accounts will not be
merely an indirect and imprecise means of monitoring economic activity but will also
be systematicaUy misleading. As long as the relationship between measured and un-
measured activity is constant, the conventional accounts will at least reflect reasona-
bly faithfully changes in overall economic activity, but if the relationship itself is
changing, it is no longer possible, without additional information, to infer the charac¬
teristics of aggregate economic change.
The nature of the problems that arise from the consideration of marketed produc¬
tion rather than sustainable consumption might best be conveyed by illustration. It
has been stressed, for example, that virtually all societies at all times have provided
themselves by one means or another with textiles, tools and other simple manufac-
tures. For much of human history these simple goods have been produced directly by
those, or the mear kin of those, who were ultimately to consume them and this pro¬
duction was often totally removed from any sort of market transaction.8 Gradually,
6. It perhaps should be noted that William D. Nordhaus and James Tobin, in a preliminary
calculation, show that the depreciation of consumer durables other than houses is more sig¬
nificant for its logical implications than for its practical consequences. See Nordhaus, Wil¬
liam D., and Tobin, James, Is Growth Obsolete? in: National Bureau of Economic Research,
Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect—Economic Growth, Fiftieth Anniversary
Colloquium V, New York 1972. There is another complication, however, which Tobin and
Nordhaus do not consider. This concerns the incidence of capital gains and losses that oc¬
curs because of unanticipated changes in the relative prices of capital goods. Such relative
price changes cause the anticipated time profile of depreciation to differ from the actual pat¬
tem. If relative capital goods prices rise, the firm simultaneously realizes a capital gain (be¬
cause it bought the equipment relatively cheaply) but also must adjust upwards its deprecia¬
tion allowances (because the equipment is more expensive to replace). The reverse occurs
when relative capital goods prices fall: the firm suffers a capital loss and must adjust down-
wards the appropriate depreciation allowance.
7. It is necessary to stress "sustainable" consumption in order to exclude from consideration
consumption that is made possible by a temporary deterioration in the capital stock.
8. Hymer, Stephen, and Resnick, Stephen, A Model of an Agrarian Economy with Non-Agricul-
tural Activities, in: American Economic Review, 59 (1969), pp. 493-506.
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however, this domestic production became more specialized in certain regions and
surplus producers began to seil an increasing fraction of their output in formal mar¬
kets, often organized by a merchant entrepreneur who would "put out" raw materials
to cottage workers and market the finished goods produced by those workers. Even¬
tuaUy, when the technology of manufacture was sufficiently sophisticated, specializa¬
tion would advance further and workers would no longer toil in their own cottages
but were forced or lured into factories.9 Thus over time an increasing proportion of
economic activity came to be mediated by markets. If this process were to be mea¬
sured by the conventional NIPA, the rate of increase of output, which was often
quite rapid in any case due to undeniable technical progress, would be greatly over-
stated, for self-sufficient production would not be counted. Thus the changes re¬
corded in the NIPA would inciude the effects both of more productive techniques
and of changes in the proportion of total output marketed. The timing and intensity
of an "industrial revolution" can, by the mechanical application of conventional
methods, be more apparent than real, with output levels much higher at an earlier
date than indicated by the conventional accounts and growing much more slowly.
A problem similar in nature is currently affecting contemporary national income
accounting as female labour force participation rates rise.10 Imagine two neighbour-
ing households, in each of which a housewife does her own cooking and cleaning.
The NIPA would record only the intermediate inputs (e. g. unprocessed foods and
soap) that each bought, the value ofthe transformed inputs—the hot meals on the ta¬
ble and the clean sheets on the bed—being ignored. Now suppose that each house¬
wife decides to specialize, one doing only cooking and the other only cleaning, and
that each sells her surplus in a formal market and buys in the same market the good
she no longer produces. In this case, the market value of the labour of each woman is
duly recorded in the NIPA, along with, as before, any intermediate purchases. The
NIPA will record a great increase in activity but clearly a large fraction of this re¬
corded increase is nominal and not real because home labour was previously ignored
by Convention. To be sure, this change may also be accompanied by a legitimate Out¬
put increase as a result of economies of scale and technological progress, but such an
increase is likely to be small compared to the recorded change. This deliberately sim¬
ple example captures the essence of important structural changes currently taking
place in the labour forces of modern industrial economies. As an increased propor¬
tion of women leave their children in day-care centres, buy prepared foods in super-
markets and fast-food carry-outs, send their cleaning and mending to specialist firms,
recorded national income rises, but the increase is obviously greater than the increase
in real output simply because such a large proportion of home-centered production
had previously been ignored. This problem is the exact reverse of the one encoun¬
tered in the nineteenth Century British NIPA which show the rate of growth of house¬
hold production falling with the decline in the rate of increase of domestic servants.1
]
9. This process has recentiy been reviewed by Pollard, Sidney, Peaceful Conquest, London
1981, pp. 63-78.
10. The extent of this problem has been explicitly recognised by the British Central Statistical
Office. See Maurice, Sources and Methods, p. 8.
11. Ebury, Marke, and Preston, Brian, Domestic Service in Late Victorian and Edwardian Eng¬
land, 1871-1914: Reading Geographical Papers No. 42, Whiteknights/Reading/England
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It is safe to assume that consumption of household production did not fall as the re¬
corded number of domestic servants feil but rather that it was the market mediation
involved in household production that changed
The corrections of the obvious anomahes introduced into histoncal analysis by
changes in the extent of market mediation are not conceptually difficult to compre-
hend but are hkely to prove difficult to implement because the amount of indirect es¬
timation required is likely to be large and because the resulting estimates are unhkely
to be highly robust with respect to vanous assumptions Clearly what is needed is an
estimate in the one example of the manufacturing output of seif sufficient farms and
in the other an estimate ofthe value of vanous household tasks What is being sought
is a measure of final output for consumption that is independent of the degree of
market mediation If such a measure can be found, only real output changes that are
independent of marketing changes will be recorded Although this requirement is a
dauntmg one, before despairing, it should be recalled that it is with precisely such
matters and details that economic and social histonans have recentiy concerned
themselves While the necessary data may at present be highly fragmentary and in¬
complete, there is every prospect that it will become more complete in the future, es¬
pecially as research attention is directed to issues where competing histoncal inter¬
pretations are particularly sensitive to the choice of analytical assumption Further¬
more, recent advances in Simulation modeling offer means of utihzing fragmentary
Information much more efficiently than has been possible previously
13
Simulation
modeling involves describing a fragmentary data series by the known distnbution
(such as the normal, exponential, or gamma distnbution) which on both empincal
and theoretical grounds is most consistent with the currently available evidence and
then using combinations of such distributions to yield a distnbution of operating re¬
sults for the process being studied For example, Jeremy Atack used the procedure to
assess the relative capital and operating costs of steam and water power in the early
nineteenth Century American economy but it can easily be seen that the same tech¬
niques can be used to estimate the average costs of providing, for example, vanous
types of household consumption, using manuals of domestic management and iso¬
lated wage data for servants where Atack used contemporary engine pnce hsts and
engineenng estimates
Much more senous problems, both conceptually and quantitatively, anse in the
treatment of leisure, obviously a highly esteemed element of consumption The na¬
ture of this problem, which is clearly related to the general problem of assessing non-
marketed output, is easily seen Imagine two economies, identical in all respects ex-
1976, Table 5a, p 23 and Lewis, W Arthur, Growth and Fluctuations 1870-1913 London,
1978, Table A3
12 On pre-industrial manufacturing, see for example, Mendels, Franklin, F , Proto industnaliza¬
tion The First Phase of the Industnalization Process in Journal of Economic History, 32
(1972), pp 241-261 On household labour, see Goldin, Claudia, Household and Market Pro
duction of Famihes in a Late Nineteenth Century American City in Explorations in Eco
nomic History, 16 (1979), pp 111-131, Ebury and Preston, Domestic Service pp 85-104 and
Hörn, P , The Rise and Fall ofthe Victorian Servant London, 1975
13 See, for example, Atack, Jeremy, Fact in Fiction9 The Relative Costs of Steam and Water
Power a Simulation Approach in Explorations in Economic History, 16 (1979), pp 409-
437
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cept the way in which the benefits of technological change in a particular year are
consumed. Suppose that in the first economy the hours of work and intensity of ef¬
fort remain unchanged and that all of the benefits of the technological advance ac¬
crue in the form of more goods and Services. By contrast, suppose that in the second
economy the initial Output of goods and Services is maintained and that all of the
benefits of the technological advance accrue in the form of fewer hours worked in Or¬
der to obtain an unchanged level of material output. While by assumption, the two
economies differ only in the composition of consumption, they appear markedly dif¬
ferent in the conventional NIPA. In the first case, measured marketed income rises
by the maximum amount permitted by the hypothesized technological advance. In
the second case, measured marketed income does not rise at all although by assump¬
tion the increase in real productive capacity in the two economies was identical. It is
obviously a critical weakness of the NIPA that the measure of economic activity
should be so sensitive to its structure and composition. Moreover, in their pioneer re-
working of the conventional NIPA, William Nordhaus and James Tobin found that
the assumptions they employed to evaluate changes in available leisure dominated
their measure of sustainable economic welfare.14
This result stemmed from the authors* inability to determine whether leisure time
was itself a final consumption good or whether leisure time was only one of several
inputs into a consumption process. If leisure time itself were the final consumption
good, the necessary adjustments to the NIPA are straightforward. The change in the
number of leisure hours, measured most plausibly as reductions in Standard working
hours but strictly excluding involuntary unemployment, is estimated for the economy
as a whole and weighted by the average hourly earnings of those workers who obtain
such reductions.15 Note that this procedure assumes that workers are indifferent at
the margin between earning another hour's income with which to consume more ma¬
terial goods or forgoing the material goods in favour of leisure. In this case, where
leisure time itself is the final consumption good, comparisons across time are quite
easy. An hour of leisure in 1880 is worth in ultimate consumption exactly as much as
an hour in 1913 or in 1980 (assuming a constant marginal utüity of leisure).
If on the other hand, however, the historian wishes to argue that leisure time is
only one of a number of inputs into a consumption process, changes in the economy
over time, most notably technological and demographic changes, make intertemporal
comparisons for a particular economy or contemporaneous comparisons among
economies with different technological capabilities much more difficult. Consider,
for example, the impact of cheap rail transport in the nineteenth Century on the lei¬
sure activities ofthe British working class.16 The rapid growth of seaside resorts and
other amusement centres following the advent of cheap rail travel is strong testimony
of the contribution this form of technological change had on the enjoyment of leisure
14. Nordhaus and Tobin, Is Growth Obsolete?, pp. 38-48. Involuntary unemployment is strictly
excluded from measures of leisure time. (pp. 44-45).
15. Standard working hours may change through variations in the working hours per day, in the
working days per week, in the working weeks per year, or in the working years per life-
time.
16. Hawke, G. R., Railways and Economic Growth in England and Wales, 1840-1870, Oxford
1970, pp. 37-40, 52-54.
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time. Similar arguments can be made for the impact of cheap books and magazines,
bicycles, automobiles, cinemas, television, sports facilities and equipment and so
forth. To the extent that technological progress enlarges and enriches the consump¬
tion of leisure time, a comprehensive set of NIPA must value leisure more highly
over time as technological progress occurs. Nordhaus and Tobin propose doing this
by deflating the nominal value of leisure hours over time (and by implication, be¬
tween countries) by the price index of consumer goods, an index which over long pe¬
riods of time has risen less rapidly than an index of nominal wages or earnings. The
conceptual problems inherent in choice of index cannot readily be evaded because
the decision taken makes a crucial difference in outcome. Nordhaus and Tobin's esti¬
mate of the per capita increase in measured economic welfare in the U.S. between
1929 and 1962 is 18.6% if leisure itself is a final good but 126.4% if leisure is consid¬
ered a process fully participating in the benefits of technological change.17
Nordhaus and Tobin do not venture a resolution of the uncertainty created by the
need to devise an appropriate measure over time of the value of leisure. Their pur¬
pose rather was to illustrate a means by which a complex, vital problem could be ap-
proached, in the belief that sustained investigation would ultimately yield greater un¬
derstanding. In pursuing this problem further, historians may very reasonably em¬
ploy a much more detailed index of leisure activities than the illustrative one used by
Nordhaus and Tobin. Each component of a more detailed index would have its
own separate price deflator and the weights attached to each component would be
chosen to reflect the relative significance, as contemporaries are believed to have
seen it, of each component. Here again is an opportunity to use systematicaUy and
quantitatively the results of recent research in social history. Such work has added
greatly to the knowledge of how the past was actually lived by most people and the
revision ofthe conventional NIPA offers an opportunity to use this new knowledge
extensively.
Unfortunately, beneficial technological change is not the only influence on leisure
enjoyment which must be assessed. Non-market costs, particularly those associated
with congestion and overcrowding as more people tried to take advantage of new lei¬
sure facilities, must also be considered. There are a number of ways this task could
be approached. For example, cross-section studies could be used which would relate,
say, rent charges in various resort areas to the density of vacationers. The steepness
of the slope of such a relationship would permit appropriate adjustments for the ef¬
fect of congestion. The purpose of such adjustments would be more in the nature of
ascertaining the relative magnitudes of the considerations involved than of generat¬
ing precise estimates of what must ultimately be arbitrary magnitudes.
It is of great importance that historians do not expect resolution of the problems
raised by the consumption of goods and Services whose value cannot be directly cal¬
culated—goods such as proto-industrial manufactures and ill-defined but highly de¬
sirable Services such as leisure—to be achieved quickly. Rather resolution will occur
through the slow, controversy-prone process of creating a concensus among histo¬
rians regarding the significance of the various assumptions made to produce quanti¬
tative estimates. Progress will not occur because a correct answer can be found—for
there is unlikely to be a unique correct answer—but because the process of investiga-
17. Nordhaus and Tobin, Is Growth Obsolete?, Table A16, line 16, pp. 52-53.
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tion will methodically expose important issues and problems and allow the quantita¬
tive significance of different assumptions to be carefully recorded.
//
Concentration on marketed production rather than sustainable consumption encour-
ages the blurring ofthe critical distinction between intermediate and and final goods.
It is well-known that failure to preserve this distinction results in serious double
counting. The most obvious example of an intermediate service routinely recorded in
the British NIPA as a final output ist the expense incurred by workers commuting to
work.18 As in many other similar situations, this Convention has been adopted due to
a desire to obtain a precise measurement rather than engage in what amounts to spe-
culation, even if this requires an inappropriate definition of what is to be measured.
The problem is that it is difficult to distinguish travel for pleasure, indisputably part
of final consumption, from travel required for work. Thus expenditures on final
goods and Services are overstated by the amount spent on commuting, which is not a
consumption item but an intermediate input; factor incomes, which should be calcu¬
lated net of commuting expenses, are overstated to the extent such expenses are not
deducted; and value added by productive enterprises is overstated because the pay¬
ments for the intermediate inputs of commuters' travel have not been properly de¬
ducted. Double counting has taken place in this case just as if both the cost of bread
and the cost of the flour that went into the bread were added together to estimate to¬
tal expenditure. Commuters' expenditures, however, are only the most obvious form
of double counting. There are quantitatively much more important sources of this er¬
ror, the most important of which are connected with government expenditure. Such
government Services as national defense, police, and public health and sanitation are
not reasonably enjoyed for their own sake but because their provision makes possible
genuine consumption. It is of critical importance to realize that the decision to disal-
low such government expenditure as final consumption in no way implies that such
expenditures are not useful or important. Indeed, an inadequate provision of them
will invariably result in a sharp reduction in properly measured final consumption.
At the same time, the consistent Classification of such expenditures as intermediate
prevents any deterioration of a society's postition which necessitates higher levels of
national defense and police spending from being recorded as a condition that im-
proves social welfare. Accordingly, expenditures on intermediate government Ser¬
vices should be excluded from national income, factor incomes should be calculated
net of the taxes and other payments necessary to finance these Services, and calcula¬
tions of value added must be made net of the value of such Services which are prop¬
erly considered intermediate inputs. It remains an interesting exercise to recalcuate
conventional historical NIPA for the major European countries excluding such in¬
strumental and regrettably necessary intermediate expenditure as defense and police
Services. For example, the levels of regrettably necessary defense expenditures re¬
quired by the diplomatic and military positions of France and Britain respectively in
the years between 1871 and 1914 were sufficiently different to suggest that the differ-
18. Maurice, Sources and Methods, pp. 173-76.
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ence between the two countries in the level of net output, properly defined, and the
level of conventional output, counting defense Services in national output as a final
good, was sufficiently great that choice of accounting procedure, if applied uni-
formly in the two countries and making proper allowance for the value of con-
scripted soldiers' Services, would substantiaUy alter perceptions of economic Per¬
formance.
The existence of important intermediate goods such as national defense and police
protection present no difficult conceptual problems. The interpretive decisions are
made in determining what is to be designated a final good or service and what inter¬
mediate. Very little need be done to the present procedures for collecting statistics for
the NIPA. The conventional NIPA can be easily altered to yield estimates of final
output, expenditure, and related net factor incomes by re-allocation. However, con¬
cern with intermediate goods and Services that are properly considered regrettable
necessities and instrumental expenditures is closely related to negative externalities
and disamenities, the significance of which are much harder to measure, Nordhaus
and Tobin, who otherwise are able generally to suggest attractive, operational ap¬
proaches to national income accounting problems, have no systematic Solution to of¬
fer for the most fundamental problem that historians must consider in this regard:
whether population growth should be seen ultimately as the source of most negative
externalities and disamenities or whether population growth genuinely reflects both a
society's conscious desire and its physical ability to support more people. Because
population-related issues appear so frequently in the conceptually difficult area of
negative externalities and disamenities, consideration of this question is fundamen¬
tal. Wherever decreasing returns to scale exist, or where important resources such as
fuels, minerals, and arable land are in inelastic supply, a society's ability simulta¬
neously to support more people and to raise real living Standards is an impressive
economic achievement. Clearly, it costs societies a great deal in terms of forgone con¬
sumption to nurture and equip a growing labour force. Using a constant returns to
scale Cobb-Douglas production function, which assumes an economy-wide ease of
factor Substitution rarely encountered in specific industries, and making a variety of
assumptions about desired wealth-income ratios for given steady-state rates of pop¬
ulation increase, Nordhaus and Tobin estimated that for the relatively moderately
growing U.S. population of 1960, a move from an equilibrium population growth rate
of 2.14% per year to zero population growth would have raised per capita consump¬
tion levels by the order of 10%.19 The assessment of this figure obviously depends
upon how off-spring are regarded. The material value of off-spring can be estimated
by a variety of means. One of the most promising, for example, would use a sample
of linked Census and tax records to calculate age-specific fertility rates across in¬
come groups.20 A finding that wealthier families had on average fewer children and
that the fertility patterns of wealthier families were imitated in the rest of society with
a lag would lend support to the argument that in such circumstances the observed
material cost of child-rearing was greater than the anticipated gain. If the patterns
were reversed, with wealthier families for a long period of time having more children
19. Nordhaus and Tobin, Is Growth Obsolete?, pp. 18-24.
20. For the possibilities of record linkage in general, see McCIoskey, Donald N., Does the Past
Have Useful Economics? in: Journal of Economic Literature, 14 (1976), pp. 441-448.
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than poorer families, the conclusion that children were viewed as income elastic con¬
sumption goods would be appropriate. In any case, a careful study of the relation¬
ship between income levels and population growth for different countries at different
periods would offer a much richer data base from which to assess, as Nordhaus and
Tobin have done for the U.S., the material cost of child-rearing. These estimates in
turn would allow a calculation of the material gains (or losses) that should be con¬
trasted with the negative externalities and disamenities of population growth.21
Although at present there are only the crude estimates of consumption forgone in
favour of child-rearing derived from simple growth modeis, Nordhaus and Tobin do
offer an illustration inviting imitation of how the complex question of negative exter¬
nalities might be handled.22 They note that there appears to be a systematic Variation
in earnings across U.S. cities of different sizes, with earnings highest in the largest,
most densely populated cities most fully exposed to the costs and disadvantages of
congestion, pollution, and other negative externalities and disamenities. They then
suggest that two sets of factors might explain this pattern. In the first set are those
factors unrelated to negative externalities and disamenities: these are taken to be (1)
median years of schooling achieved by the labour force; (2) proportion ofthe popu¬
lation over 65 and presumed to be retired with low earned incomes; (3) proportion of
the population Negro and presumed to suffer from non-environmentally related dis-
crimination; (4) the migration rate where a net inflow is presumed to reflect anticipa-
tion of high and rising real incomes and a net outflow the reverse; (5) property taxes
per capita, included to capture the impact of physical capital which can be expected
to cause patterns of observed earned income, especially those of self-employed shop¬
keepers, merchants, and various other types of local businessmen, to vary; (6) local
government expenditures per capita, included to capture the benefits of public Ser¬
vices. The remaining factors are those related to environmental costs for which an
earnings premium would be necessary, other things being equal, in order to induce
people to work in a less pleasant environment. This second set of factors includes: (1)
population size; (2) population density; and (3) proportion of the population in a
metropolitan county Iiving within urban boundaries, a variable dictated by the man¬
ner in which the data were available. The logarithm of median family income in a
sample of metropolitan counties was regressed against the nine independent varia¬
bles listed above. The estimated coefficients on the three variables in the second set,
presumed to reflect negative externalities and disamenities, were then used to calcu-
late the implicit premiums necessary in order to compensate people for living in a
more crowded, dangerous, noisy, dirty urban environment. Nordhaus and Tobin esti¬
mated that for the U.S. in 1965 the premium was equal to 8% of average U.S. disposa¬
ble family income and that this figure would have risen to about 30% had the entire
U.S. population been concentrated in the most densely populated cities.
The great value of Nordhaus and Tobin's pioneering work is not so much the spe¬
cific quantitative estimates obtained, although those estimates are of great interest
because they represent the most informed evaluation currently available of the im-
21. Interestingly, Nordhaus and Tobin suggest that population growth in the recent U.S. past
has been as rapid as it has been because the social costs of children have not been borne by
parents but by society at large. See Nordhaus and Tobin, Is Growth Obsolete?, pp. 18-24.
22. Nordhaus and Tobin, Is Growth Obsolete?, pp. 48-54.
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pact of many important but hard to measure factors, but rather the opportunity it of¬
fers to ennch and extend the already elaborate histoncal collections of national in¬
come statistics
It is very reasonable to expect, on the basis of what has been done so far, that the
process of ennchment and extension will give new meaning and significance to his¬
toncal data that has not been heavily drawn upon for lack of a systematic means of
assimilation and assessment23 The NIPA, modified to ensure logical consistency and
refocussed to measure consumption rather than marketed production, provide a
framework capable of processing, categonzing and evaluating data on a much
greater scale than has been attempted so far Furthermore, the national income ac¬
counts, in both modified and unmodified form, can be combined with what Mervyn
King has described as "social indicators" to assess more broadly and more search-
mgly trends in welfare
24
King compiled an index of 17 social indicators scaled such
that high values reflected improvement and low values deterioration of welfare The
indicators, chosen for Wide coverage across countries rather than for intnnsic impor¬
tance, included public expenditure on education as proportion of GNP, students per
100,000 ofthe population, proportion of total students who were female, doctors per
10,000 persons, infant mortahty rate, suicide rate, stomach ulcer death rate, and tele-
phones per 100 persons Kmg's procedures could be easily extended to cover such in¬
dicators as male and female hfe expectancy, average length of work week and work
23 A vanant of Nordhaus and Tobin's procedure has already been applied to nineteenth een
tury Britain by Jeffrey G Wilhamson, Urban Disamenities Dark Satanic Mills and the Bnt¬
ish Standard of Living Debate in Journal of Economic History, 41 (1981), pp 75-83 His
conclusions are not dissimilar to Nordhaus and Tobin's Wilhamson found that the disa
menity premium required to induce workers to endure harsh urban environments was no
more than 8% of observed urban wage rates However, in two important aspects of his study,
Williamson appears to have biased downwards his estimate of the disamenity premium
First, he included a cost of living index as an independent variable to capture wage rate var
lations not related to environmental disamenities But, since the object of estimating the dis
amenity premium was to determine what proportion of higher nominal wage rates went to
compensate for the disadvantage of urban hfe, which would inciude high site rents as one
aspect of congestion, the highly significant coefficient on the cost of living index should
have been used in rather than excluded from the estimation of the disamenitv premium, par
ticularly since the cost of living vanable is picking up influences that would otherwise be
captured by the population density and population size variables Secondly, he assumed that
the vanable infant mortahty would pick up the main impact of urban disamenities But
many other factors, especially overall fertility levels, which in the short term are at best only
remotely related to either wage rates or urban disamenities will also effect infant mortality
and this remote relationship will be reflected in a small, relatively insignificant coefficient
On the other hand, Wilhamson did not control, as Nordhaus and Tobin did, for other fac
tors, notably returns to education and skills, differential labour force participation rates, and
migration rates, that would cause wage rates to vary, thus making his results incompatible
with Nordhaus and Tobin's and hard to Interpret
Wilhamson's effort does hold out the promise that further, systematic exploitation of histori
cal data will provide more Illumination on this issue To the extent that Wilhamson s objec
tive was to provoke further research, his paper is certain to be a success
24 King, Mervyn A, Economic Growth and Social Development A Statistical Investigation in
The Review of Income and Wealth, 20 (1974), pp 251-272
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year, occupational accidents, unemployment, divorce rates, strike records, public ex¬
penditure on leisure and the arts, and net migration. Such greater coverage would
make interpretation easier. For the 17 indicators that he did choose, King found that
the movements of his unweighted composite index tended to be positively correlated
with convenrionally measured economic growth, although the strength of this rela¬
tionship showed some signs of diminution over time. Such findings, if confirmed
more widely in historical studies for a broader ränge of social indicators would allow
researchers to use the conventional NIPA with increased confidence.
Such analysis also suggests a natural and practical way to modify the interpreta¬
tion of the conventional or modified NIPA when a substantial and persistent diver¬
gence in measures does occur. It would thus be possible to isolate those social indica¬
tors whose behaviour was particularly badly reflected by the income measures and to
identify the causes and to estimate the quantitative consequence of that behaviour.
In this regard, because of the quantitative importance of leisure in Nordhaus and
Tobin's study, it is interesting to note the high degree of correlation in late Victorian
Britain between the reduction of the length of the average full-employment work¬
week—a reduction which should be seen as increasing the amount of leisure time po¬
tentially available to workers—and the strength of convenrionally measured eco¬
nomic growth. Between 1860 and 1914, the length of the average British workweek
was reduced by 10%.25 The reductions occurred in discontinuous bursts concentrated
in periods of vigorous convenrionally measured growth.26 The period of greatest re¬
duction, accounting for perhaps two-thirds of the entire reduction in normal working
hours achieved between 1860 and 1914 occurred during the intense boom years of
1872-74. On the other hand, virtually no reduction at all occurred when the rate of
conventional growth perceptibly declined between the Boer War and the First World
War.27 The most plausible explanation of this pattern is that a reduction in the Stand¬
ard workweek was viewed by employers as a major and essentially irreversible con-
cession to the labour force and hence granted only in exceptional circumstances. In
the stable, competitive, environment of the pre-1914 British economy, only during
those infrequent times when both workers and employers could anticipate sufficient
technological advance to make the bargain feasible were normal hours reduced.
Without such expectations employers would, during periods of normal cyclical ex¬
pansion, "buy off demand for reduced hours by a combination of higher wages for
the normal workweek and an insistence that any reduction in hours be accompanied
by a proportional reduction in pay. During periods of cyclical contraction the work¬
ers' position was too delicate to withstand the effort to win a major concession. As
long as such factors are generally involved in the process of reducing normal working
hours, it is reasonable to anticipate that movements in convenrionally measured eco¬
nomic growth will generally be found, as they were in Victorian Britain, to be corre¬
lated with increases in leisure.
25. Bienefeld, Manfred Alfons, Working Hours in British Industry: An Economic History, Lon¬
don 1972, pp. 98, 111, 121, 146.
26. Bienefeld, Working Hours, pp. 193-94, 197, 201,
27. Bienefeld, Working Hours, pp. 146-48.
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The problems considered so far have all relied for their resolution, at least implicitly,
either upon observed prices directly or upon imputations based on observed prices.
The value of leisure, for example, was determined with reference to average income
payments for additional work. Where adjustment for enhanced leisure benefit due to
advances in transport or consumer durables was nesessary, the degree of adjustment
was calculated by deflating a suitable consumer price index. Allowances for urban
disamenities were evaluated by the observed earnings premium which had to be paid
to induce workers voluntarily to endure harsh urban conditions. The use of social in¬
dicators was linked to the degree of correlation between measured income and an in¬
dex of non-market indicators. Thus one way or another, directly or indirectly, ob¬
served market prices have represented an indispensible component of the assessment
and evaluation of economic activity.
But there are important circumstances where the historian may feel that observed
prices are fundamentally distorted and that any economic measure ultimately based
on such prices must be misleading, Fred Hirsch has recentiy presented a detailed crit¬
ique of economic growth based on a belief in the fundamental fallibility of observed
market prices.28 Hirsch argues that much of the consumption desired in modern
economies is centred on "positional" goods and Services whose value is determined
by the satisfaction they can provide through relative position alone, from the quality
of being in front or from the fact of others being behind.29 In this view the real value
of, for example, a desirable home site or the rewards of a responsible and fulfilling
job cannot greatly change. The value of purely positional goods is taken to be almost
completely independent of technological change. If consumers can use only so many
television sets or so many cars, after which the value of another such good becomes
virtually zero, then the limits to growth are clearly and unalterably set.
This argument is tantamount to the claim that if equilibrium prices could only be
known, the high and rising relative value attached to those things whose output could
not be increased would be clear, as would the low and falling relative value of those
things whose Output could be increased. Ultimately, in "true equilibrium" value
terms, real growth would be impossible as long as Substitution in consumption be¬
tween positional and material (or reproducible) goods was strictly limited. In this Sit¬
uation, the appearance of growth can only be an illusion created by weighting the
various categories of output by prices in fundamental disequilibrium. Such a proce¬
dure would give current period weights to positional and reproducible goods, ignor-
ing the fact that as reproducible output is increased the relative value of such output
would fall while that of positional goods would rise. Current period disequilibrium
prices undervalue positional goods and overvalue reproducible goods thereby creat¬
ing a "mirage" of economic growth, since the price weights attached to positional
goods, whose output cannot increase, rise over time whereas the price weights of re¬
producible goods, whose output can increase, fall over time. The presumed benefits
of growth thus continuaUy recede even as strenuous efforts are made to realize
them.
28. Hirsch, Fred, Social Limits to Growth, London, 1977.
29. Hirsch, Social Limits, p. 20.
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The implications of this line of argument for the interpretation of the national in¬
come accounts is serious, for it implies that the use of the observed prices upon
which the accounts are necessarily based are fundamentally incorrect and mislead¬
ing. Clearly Hirsch has identified a process which accounts at least in part for the
inabüity of even very rapid sustained economic growth to provide the füll anticipated
benefits. Yet the claim that positional goods are so dominant in aggregate consump¬
tion and so immune to Substitution by reproducible goods as largely to remove the
possibility of real economic growth is an empirical question which must be resolved
not by assertion but by extensive historical and international comparisons of eco¬
nomic development. Such research would probe the strangely ahistorical nature of
Hirsch's critique. On the one hand, the benefits of economic growth in the past are
acknowledged but on the other it is feit that continued benefits of growth cannot be
expected in the future. But why should such a Situation occur now and not a quarter
of a Century earlier or later? Comparative historical research would establish the ex¬
tent to which expenditure on specific positional goods actually has comprised, after
allowing for the effects of population growth which amplify the inherent scarcity of
positional goods, a stable or rising proposition of total real income, as Hirsch's anal¬
ysis predicts should occur.
Although it is not possible to anticipate completely the results of research still to
be carried out, it would appear Hirsch underestimated the ability of modern technol¬
ogy to create Substitutes for positional goods. Since Hirsch often illustrated his argu¬
ment by reference to the example of a limited number of desirable sites for houses, it
is useful to recall how transport improvements, trains in the nineteenth Century and
cars in the twentieth, by making accessable desirable sites that were previously too
remote or inaccessible for extensive use have increased the stock of choice sites,
thereby undermining in this instance the very concept of positional goods. Similarly
while it remains an open question whether the relative availability of rewarding and
fulfilling jobs and occupations has increased as measured growth has occurred, it is
clear that modern household appliances, like refrigerators, washing machines and
dishwashers, whose production and sale if not use is fully recorded in the conven¬
tional NIPA, have renoved a substantial amount of the drudgery that blighted and
limited the lives of most people in the past. Furthermore, it would appear that the
greater variety of consumption goods that has become available over time has acted
to diffuse both the pleasure of possessing highly esteemed positional goods and the
dissatisfaction of not doing so. After all, as R. C. O. Matthews noted in his generally
appreciative review of Hirsch's book, in an economy where no growth takes place, all
goods are positional and the possibilities for Substitution among consumption goods
is much more harshly limited than is true in an expanding economy.30 Finally, it
should be noted that health care and education, two Services whose provision has
moved in close parallel with movements in the conventional income accounts and are
thus manifestly not positional goods, have come to account for a larger share of Out¬
put in most countries over time.31 Ultimately Hirsch's argument serves to stress the
30. Matthews, R. C. O., Review of 'Social Limits to Growth', in: The Economic Journal, 87
(1977), p. 576.
31. Some care must be taken when measuring these Services to avoid double counting. Thus
education that is solely for occupational and professional advancement should be consid-
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importance of careful construction of indices of economic activity, supported by
close Observation of consumption patterns over time, a task in which Simon Kuznets'
pioneering work should offer a most useful base for further research.32 If anything,
Hirsch's reservations concerning the desirability or even the possibility of economic
growth provides further rationale for a revision ofthe conventional NIPA along the
consumption-oriented lines proposed by Nordhaus and Tobin.
There is, however, a dynamic variant of Hirsch's argument which increases even
further the importance of comparative, historical research. The variant was first given
explicit expression by E. J. Mishan and subsequently was formalized by Stephen
Glaister.33 The phenomenon that Mishan and Glaister were concerned with was the
potentially unstable nature of desirable economic equilibria and the subsequent like¬
lihood that normal competitive behaviour would lead to the abandonment of desir¬
able equilibria in favour of substantiaUy less desirable equilibria which would then
be very difficult to change. Indeed, in the final, undesirable, equilibrium position, the
structure of prices would create a very strong disincentive for any change. The argu¬
ment is most easily grasped in the form of an example, but it is readily seen that gen¬
eralizations can easily be made. Consider a transport system where no private vehi-
cles exist and only public trams and buses are available. Now suppose that one per¬
son suddenly realizes that with a private car be could reduce his travel time to work
by half, so long as his were the only private car on the road. If, however, many others
shortly afterwards make the same discovery independently and attempt the same ac¬
tion, without reckoning on the congestion costs, the anticipated benefits will prove il-
lusory for all. The congestion caused by only one car will be negligible, but the effect
of many people simultaneously switching to private cars, even if each is correct in re-
alizing that the impact of his own action alone is trivial, is not at all negligible. The
trouble is clearly that travellers are making decisions on information that will begin
to change and be incorrect as soon as the decisions are made, yet no individual trav-
eller can by himself know what the final outcome, and hence what the correct infor¬
mation for a rational decision, will be. In the example, eventuaUy a new equilibrium
is reached where many people use private cars, many fewer than previously use pub¬
lic transport, and travel time for all is increased. The previous equilibrium, where no
private transport existed, is actually superior to the one that eventuaUy emerges from
the introduction of private transport because of the unregulated increase in conges¬
tion. But for the same reasons which created the problem in the first place, the origi¬
nal equilibrium is very difficult to regain. The benefit perceived by any one individ¬
ual in taking public transport rather than his own car is negligible but if many could
be persuaded to take public transport, all would gain, those continuing to use their
earned incomes of those who received the education and should not, therefore, be counted
separately. The educational expenditure that should be recorded as final output must be lim¬
ited to that which enhances leisure and living in general. Similarly, expenditures on health
and medicine necessitated by environmental deterioration and occupational hazards must be
excluded.
32. Kuznets, Simon, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread, New Haven/Conn.
1966, pp. 262-284.
33. Mishan, E. J., The Costs of Economic Growth, Harmondsworth/Middlesex/England 1969,
pp. 232-240, and Glaister, Stephen, Transport Pricing Policies and Efficient Urban Growth,
in: Journal of Public Economics, 5 (1976), pp. 103-117.
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own cars gaining most. Hence everyone hopes that everyone eise will take public
transport, but no one does and the Situation never improves. These obvious difficul¬
ties are greatly compounded if public transport is competitively eliminated as travell¬
ers switch to private cars. The greater is the proportion of fixed to total costs of pub¬
lic transport, the more dependent it is on intensive utilization and hence the more
vulnerable its revenue to any decline in traffic. The elimination of public transport,
by removing any choice in transport mode, clearly is the worst outcome, yet one
which may be difficult to prevent without the imposition by a central authority of a
set of "shadow" transport prices which take account of the costs of congestion and
the importance of choice. The calculation of efficient shadow prices is not simple.
The planning authority must correctly price a veriety of transport Systems whose Op¬
erations it cannot directly observe but must deduce from knowledge of both the tech¬
nical characteristics of transport equipment and the preferences of travellers and
shippers.34
In the Mishan-Glaister example, only with correct equilibrium shadow prices
could the benefits of current consumption be evaluated and plans for future invest¬
ment rationally made. Yet the congestion externalities that caused such price calcula¬
tions to be so difficult to make are likely to be a pervasive feature of modern eco¬
nomic life and to intensify as development proceeds, for they are, as in the Mishan-
Glaister example, created as a by-product of the same process of technological
change that is the source of economic growth in the first place. But if prices are syste¬
maticaUy distorted in the way suggested, the national income accounts will not just
measure the wrong thing; movements in the NIPA may even be perverse in relation
to the real underlying economy. In the example above, when private transport was
introduced, measured expenditure on private transport rose, measured expenditure
on public transport feil, and the benefits of private vehicle ownership increased. But
the increased benefits of private vehicle ownership were due to the deterioration of
public transport and it can be shown that the net change in total social welfare may
easily be negative even when observed total expenditure has risen, because more con-
sumer's surplus is being extracted by the provision of transport Services than was true
previously. In such a Situation, the same observed prices that lead to suboptimal re¬
source aUocations will yield incorrect and inappropriate national account esti¬
mates.
As the Mishan-Glaister example suggests, and Levin's study of railroad deregula-
tion confirms, the analytical derivation of even a few of the prices needed for ration-
aldecision-making and accurate NIPA is a difficult undertaking. For the foreseeable
future it will not be realistic to anticipate plausible calculations of equilibrium
prices.35 Thus the only reliable means of assessing the market prices the historian ob-
34. See Levin, Richard C, Railroad Rates, Profitability, and Welfare Under Deregulation, in:
Bell Journal of Economics, 12 (1981), pp. 1-26, for a discussion of the complex considera¬
tions involved in such analysis.
35. A recent paper by James, John A, The Welfare Effects ofthe Antebellum Tariff: A General
Equilibrium Analysis, in: Exploration in Economic History, 15 (1978), pp. 231-256, has de¬
monstrated that equilibrium price vectors of interest to historians can in principle be calcu¬
lated. It is likely that such work will become more common in the near future, offering histo¬
rians a very powerful new analytical tool.
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serves require extensive international, histoncal comparisons While it is, of course,
always possible that all countries will make the same mistakes and move towards the
same inferior equilibrium, it is not hkely Thus examples of unusually successful Or¬
ganization or of notably sustained advance may be effectively used to investigate the
nature of feasible equilibria While this procedure may fail to capture the best possi¬
ble outcome available to an economy at any point in time, it is unhkely that a large
number of societies with different economic, pohtical and technological arrange¬
ments and capabilities will all miss the best Solution equally badly The results of
such compansons may de difficult to interpret, but, since cross-country histoncal
compansons are as close as the economic observer can get to a controlled expen-
ment, there is very httle choice but to use them
If the analysis of economic Performance inevitably requires extensive international
compansons, more attention must be devoted to the notonously difficult task of im¬
proving the Statistical basis for such compansons While no comprehensive Solution
exists, two recent proposals promise marked improvement These proposals will also
aid in the comparison of a given economy's Performance at different points m its
own history
The first proposal advocates facing directly the problem that pnce stmctures are
determined jointly by the distnbution of wealth and productive capacity When com-
panng the efficiency of two economies, Performance is to be measured by reference
to how well the needs of specific groups common to both are met Such an approach
has been used by A K Sen to compare inter-state disparities of welfare Standards in
India
36
Sen explicitly gave higher consumption weights to the relatively poor so that
his comparison of Performance was particularly sensitive to the consumption experi¬
ence of his bench mark social group Such a procedure has the great benefit of mak¬
ing the welfare basis of comparisons exphcit Of course the assessment of Perfor¬
mance may vary with the benchmark consumer group chosen, but even this factor is
beneficial, for histonans have often realized that common developments have differ¬
ential impacts and the use of several benchmark groups, to the extent that expen-
ences are sharply different, serves to indicate quantitatively the vanety of expenence
the historian wants to examine Furthermore, because the approach using benchmark
groups rehes on knowledge of expenditure patterns, knowledge which is largely inde¬
pendent of the conventional accounts, it offers a valuable supplementary cross-check
to those accounts Also it can readily be combined with the second recent proposal to
aid international compansons
The second proposal has used detailed calculations of purchasing power panties
between countries in order to obtain a more "realistic" set of exchange rates
37
Such
adjustment is necessary because tanffs, quotas, and other forms of administrative In¬
tervention—such as central bank Operations—distort exchange rates from the levels
that would rule if only pure demand and supply factors were operating Furthermore,
even if exchange rates were in fundamental real equihbnum, countnes with different
productive structures or consumption patterns may have sufficiently different ratios
36 Sen, Amartya K, Real National Income in Review of Economic Studies, 43 (1976), pp 19-
39
37 David, Paul A , Just How Misleading Are Official Exchange Rate Conversions9 in The Eco
nomic Journal, 82 (1972), pp 979-90
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of tradeable and non-tradeable production that cross-country comparisons based on
exchange rates alone may be misleading or unnecessarily incomplete. The procedure
proposed by Paul David to adjust market exchange rates uses the relative price
weights that obtain in the benchmark country—in his case, the U.S. on the grounds
that by common consent for the period he was considering (1950-1965) the U.S. was
internationally the most advanced economy, with its structure increasingly approxi-
mated by the rest ofthe world—to value output and consumption in other countries.
The levels of Output in all countries are then compared using the benchmark coun¬
try's prices and the relative rankings of countries obtained on this basis are compared
with the relative rankings obtained by valuing national Outputs at market exchange
rates. Specifically, the following equation was estimated:
fYol 0.671 0.408 fYol
IY,J (0.063) (0.022) lYj
where Y0 = per capita Output in the benchmark country valued at the benchmark
country's relative prices.
Yj = per capita output in the ith country valued at the benchmark country's
relative prices.
Y, = per capita Output in the ith country valued in the benchmark country's
currency using the market exchange rate rather than the benchmark
country's relative prices.
The numbers in brackets under the estimated coefficients are Standard errors. The
equation may be interpreted to show that on average the difference in per capita in¬
comes in purchasing power parity terms38 between a given country and the U.S. was
only 40.8% ofthe percentage gap indicated by a straight exchange rate conversion ex¬
pressing all incomes in dollars. The explanation for this sharp reduction in income
differentials using purchasing power parity price weights and market exchange rates
is that the higher manufacturing productivity in the U.S. also raised the opportunity
cost of providing labour intensive Services which accounted for a substantial propor¬
tion of total consumption not only in the U.S. but also in all the other countries in the
comparison. When the U.S. price weighting, with its relatively high cost of Services
and low cost of manufactures was used to value Output in various developed coun¬
tries, those countries gained more in the revaluation of their comparatively abundant
Services than they lost in the revaluation of their comparatively sparse manufacturing
output.
David's procedure goes an important way towards adjusting exchange rate data to
permit its use in a much more meaningful way than was previously possible. The füll
potential in this procedure is gained when different countries are used as bench-
38. A classic index number problem prevents a true estimation of purchasing power parity. That
would require knowledge of what the Citizens of one country would have bought had they
faced with their incomes the price structure of another country. What purchasing power par¬
ity means here is a measurement of the bundles of Output in two different countries by the
same price structure. It is clear that even this restricted purchasing power parity concept al¬
lows a significant improvement on official exchange rate estimates of per capita income dif¬
ferences.
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marks in repeated calculations. Comparisons of the rankings obtained for a variety
of benchmark countries will offer a systematic means of identifying and assessing im¬
portant differences in the consumption and production structures of different coun¬
tries at different points in time. Furthermore, David's procedure can readily be com¬
bined with Sen's so that the purchasing power parity calculations are based on expli¬
cit welfare orderings rather than observed price structures which impose a welfare
basis founded on the existing distribution of wealth.39
As may readily be seen, these various procedures cannot be vested with an aura of
infallibility and precision. In their way, they are as arbitrary as the conventional ac¬
counting procedures they are intended to Supplement and replace. Their great virtue,
however, is that used in combinations they each illuminate in a different way a parti¬
cular aspect of a nation's (or a region's) historical experience. They allow most of the
subjective and judgemental differences that divide historians to be systematicaUy ex¬
posed and quantified. They permit sensitivity tests to determine which assumptions
are crucial to conclusions and which affect conclusions very little. They use in a
structured way vast amounts of historical data that simply cannot be assimilated
without an explicit analytical framework. The results of these efforts may never com¬
mand universal agreement, but the issues in dispute among historians will become
systematicaUy clearer because of them. And that surely can only be considered pro¬
gress.
Zusammenfassung:
Probleme der volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnung und
ihrer Interpretation bei der Bewertung langfristiger
wirtschaftlicher Leistungen
Hier wird davon ausgegangen, daß es bei der Messung ökonomischer Aktivitäten im
wesentlichen zwei Arten von Problemen gibt. Die erste besteht aus solchen Fragen,
die zumindest prinzipiell dadurch lösbar sind, daß man beobachtete oder abgeleitete
Marktpreise verwendet. Der zweite Problemtyp besteht aus Fragen, die nur über die
Verwendung geschätzter (oder „synthetischer") Preise gelöst werden können, weil die
beobachteten Preise aus vielerlei Gründen fehlerhaft sind. So könnte z. B. ein funda¬
mentales Marktungleichgewicht vorliegen oder eine nichttolerierbare Abhängigkeit
von einer besonderen - möglicherweise willkürlichen - Vermögensverteilung. Oder
es könnten Verzerrungen durch Schwankungen der relativen Preise oder auch durch
eine allgemeine Inflation oder eine Deflation hervorgerufen worden sein. Derartige
Verzerrungen können auch von Zöllen, von festgesetzten Handels- oder Produktions¬
quoten und unterschiedlichen anderen administrativen Eingriffen in den Markt ver¬
ursacht werden. Beide Problemtypen werden diskutiert und mit neueren Lösungsver¬
suchen dargestellt. Am Schluß der Arbeit finden sich einige Vorschläge zur weiteren
Forschung.
39. Incomes are converted into wealth equivalents by using the present discounted value of fu¬
ture income streams.
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Fragen, die zum ersten Problemtyp zählen, sind nach zwei übergeordneten Grup¬
pen klassifiziert. Die erste kleinere Gruppe befaßt sich mit logischen Widersprüchen
in der herkömmlichen volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnung, die bisher deshalb
hingenommen wurden, weil die verfügbaren Daten so leichter zu erfassen waren. Die
zweite weitaus größere und wichtigere Gruppe befaßt sich mit Problemen, die aus
der theoretisch unangemessenen Zielvorstellung über die zu messende Größe er¬
wachsen. Eigentlich sollte der Endverbrauch erfaßt werden, doch bezieht sich die
herkömmliche volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung im allgemeinen auf die ver¬
marktete Produktion. Die Diskussion der veränderten Meßmethoden, die bei einer
Abänderung der Zielgröße für die volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung erforderlich
wären, schließt die Darstellung der Pionierarbeit von Nordhaus und Tobin ein. In
diesem Abschnitt werden Punkte abgehandelt wie die Berwertung von nicht-ver-
markteter Haushaltsarbeit oder von Freizeit sowie Kosten und Nutzen des Bevölke¬
rungswachstums. Am Schluß wird die Möglichkeit erörtert, den Bereich der bisheri¬
gen volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnung durch die Einbeziehung sozialer Indika¬
toren zu erweitern.
Fragen, die zum zweiten umfassenden Problemtyp zählen, werden in Anlehnung
an das kürzlich erschienene Werk von Hirsch, Mishan und Glaister erörtert und mit
den Lösungsvorschlägen von Sen und David vorgestellt.
Nun können Historiker keine eindeutigen definitiven Antworten auf die Mehrzahl
der Probleme in der volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnung, wie sie in diesem Artikel
angesprochen wurden, erwarten. Die Vorschläge, die hier zu verschiedenartigen Re¬
visionen und Modifikationen der herkömmlichen volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrech¬
nung gemacht wurden, sollen vielmehr dazu dienen, daß die subjektiven Meinungs¬
unterschiede (die Historiker voneinander trennen) in systematischer Weise offen dar¬
gelegt und quantifiziert werden. Damit ließen sich fundamentale Fragen und Pro¬
bleme viel klarer umreißen, wenn nicht endgültig lösen.
78
